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Abstract 
Within information systems research, technology adoption is one of the most widely investigated and 
accepted research streams. Since its inception nearly two decades ago, conceptual models of the individual 
adoption decision, such as the Technology Acceptance Model (Davis 1989) and the Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (Venkatesh et al. 2003), have been used in a variety of circumstances 
with sustained success. However, recent findings suggest constructs borrowed from technology adoption 
literature are less applicable in the case of security adoption (Warkentin et al. 2004).  Unfortunately, there 
has been little empirical evidence available to substantiate or refute this claim.  In an attempt to address 
this void, the authors have undertaken a multi-phase research approach in which a representative sample 
of current IT adoption constructs are assessed as to their applicability within the IT security context.  
Consistent with the recent distinction between formative and reflective constructs, the authors followed a 
prescribed protocol and determined that perceived ease of use (PEOU) and perceived usefulness (PU) are 
formative in nature – in contrast to previous studies.  These findings have implications for the continued 
development of applicable measures of IT adoption in the security context as well as in other adoption 
studies. 
Keywords: Technology adoption, individual, TAM, UTAUT, security, assurance, behavior, scale, 
construct, formative, reflective, validation, validity 
Introduction 
What leads someone to start backing up their important data? Why would an individual routinely scan for viruses or 
spyware? What motivates an end user to install a personal firewall? Why does one employee change his password regularly? 
These questions are extremely important not only to individuals, but to large and small businesses that employ individuals 
who must practice safe computing for the entire organization to be safe. Despite considerable evidence that the greatest 
source of security risk to most enterprises is the internal threat (the individual employee), most firms spend the majority of 
their IT security budget on perimeter controls designed to prevent and detect external threats. But because the internal threat 
is the greatest source of risk, we must pursue vigorous investigations into the individual adoption decision – what can we 
learn about the reasons for individual decisions with regard to IT security technologies? 
The specific purpose of this paper is to present the findings of an initial phase of a multi-phase research endeavor in which IT 
adoption variables are examined for applicability within an IT security context.  Given the recent call to attention within the 
IS community for a clear distinction between formative vs. reflective constructs (Loch et al. 2003; Petter et al. 2007), this 
initial phase includes the identification of representative IT adoption constructs and an assessment as to their formative or 
reflective nature. In the following paragraphs, background literature on technology adoption is reviewed and arguments are 
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made for how IT adoption constructs may be insufficient for capturing the essence of IT security adoption. The next section 
describes the research methodology. This includes an identification of two representative constructs, and an evaluation of 
their reflective or formative nature. Results of the analysis are discussed, and concluding comments are made. Finally, 
implications associated with the study’s findings are suggested. 
Background 
Technology Adoption 
Historically, the principle aim of technology adoption research has been to develop conceptual models which explain 
individual intention to adopt a given technology (Venkatesh et al. 2003). Following the inception of the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) (Davis 1989), researchers have established and tested a multitude of derivative models including 
TAM2 and the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh et al. 2003). The majority of 
these follow-ups were largely a modification of the original TAM, either augmented by new predicting variables, instantiated 
for a particular technology, or both (Karahanna et al. 2006).  Indeed, as new information technologies caught the interest of 
information systems researchers, variations of TAM were published in many academic research journals (Schepers et al. 
2007). The results of a content analysis provide more information on this trend. Several hundred TAM-related articles were 
reviewed and systematically grouped by categories of technology to be adopted. The groups were subsequently refined; three 
salient technology paradigms emerged: an era of stand-alone desktop technology in the late eighties and early nineties, the 
client-server paradigm of the mid to late nineties, and the Internet era following the new millennium (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Classification of Technology Adoption Studies 
Category 
Percentage 
of Papers in 
Category 
Description Time of Influence Example Technologies 
Stand-Alone 
Desktop 
Technology 
24.95% 
Software for personal 
computers; the primary 
functionality of these 
applications exists without 
network connections.  
Late Eighties 
to early 
Nineties 
Personal productivity 
Suites; word processing, 
spreadsheet software 
Client-Server 
Technology 25.08% 
Software relying on a 
networked environment for 
main functionality. 
Early to late 
Nineties 
CRM systems; email 
systems; distributed 
databases 
Internet-Based 
Technology 49.95% 
Technologies which require 
an internet (IP) connection. 
Mid Nineties 
to present 
Web sites; Ecommerce 
portals; online classes 
A rule that might be inferred from this trend is that the publication of models for the adoption of a specific technology lags 
just behind the identification of the associated technological paradigm. Furthermore, the adoption of each successive 
paradigm’s information technologies seems to have received increasingly greater attention from behavioral researchers, as 
later eras boast more adoption models than earlier eras. Surprisingly, this heuristic does not hold for the case of information 
security technologies. 
Despite strong interest among practitioners and academics, little research on information technology (IT) security adoption 
has been conducted (Warkentin et al. 2004). Surveys and interviews of chief information officers, business managers, and IT 
professionals routinely list information security as a top concern (Leach 2003; Oppliger 2007). On the academic side, a 
number of journals have been created specifically to address the managerial and technical issues associated IT security. In 
addition, several leading academic MIS publications have begun accepting security-related articles. However, there has been 
very little published work on individual adoption of security technologies. A plausible explanation of this phenomenon is the 
inapplicability of contemporary adoption predictors to the IT security context. Given the universal acceptance of technology 
adoption theory, along with a newly-piqued interest in IT, it is possible that a number of security adoption research projects 
were started but never actually completed. If this is true, then it might be because of inadequate performance of adoption 
predictors in the security context. If the constructs are ill-suited for security adoption, then their associated models would 
have little or no explanatory power, and the findings would not warrant publication. A closer examination of this question is 
warranted. 
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To investigate this research domain, we must first select the appropriate measures for consideration.  (Please see Figure 1.)  
Then we must assess whether those scales are reflective or formative in the context of individual security technology 
adoption.  Then we must analyze the validity of the constructs, according to the validation methodologies specified for that 
type of measure (Step 3a or 3b, depending on the construct’s category).  If the measures are deemed to be invalid, then new 
measures must be developed for the security context. New scales for these constructs must be then validated.  To begin, we 
evaluate the first question – what are the most representative constructs for development in this context? 
2. Assessment of 
Existing Scales -
Formative or Reflective?Formative
Reflective
3a. Follow Prescribed
Construct
Validity Tests for
Formative Measures
3b. Follow Prescribed
Construct
Validity Tests for
Reflective Measures
1. Selection of Primary
Established Measures
for Individual
Technology Adoption
5. Publish
Findings
Valid
InvalidInvalid
4. Develop and 
Validate New Scales
In Security Context
Valid
 
Figure 1. Process for Scale Assessment and Validation 
Representative Adoption Constructs 
Because a multitude of adoption constructs exist, it was useful to select the most representative constructs for closer 
examination. This was accomplished by identifying the constructs in the most commonly cited and used model for 
technology adoption. A comprehensive search of multiple online databases revealed that the Technology Adoption Model 
(TAM), as originally proposed by Davis (1989), was the most cited conceptual model in the research stream.  At the time of 
the analysis, it was cited by 2116 articles (Google Scholar, 2007). Although dozens of more advanced adoption models have 
since been proposed, the majority of these models are based on the original TAM, and offer little additional explanatory 
power considering the relative loss in parsimony. In addition, the original constructs, Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) and 
Perceived Usefulness (PU) have been referenced in over 163 academic articles, well more than the constructs from any other 
adoption model. In sum, the two predictors, PEOU and PU remain highly representative and influential antecedents of 
technology adoption.   The measurement items for PEOU and PU are depicted in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Measurement Items for Perceived Usefulness (PU) and Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) 
Perceived Usefulness  
(PU) 
Construct Perceived Ease of Use  
(PEOU) 
Using [insert technology] in my job 
would enable me to accomplish tasks 
more quickly. 
Item #1 
My interaction with [insert 
technology] would be clear and 
understandable. 
Using [insert technology] would 
improve my job performance. Item #2 
I would find [insert technology] to 
be flexible to interact with. 
Using [insert technology] would 
improve increase my productivity. Item #3 
I would find it easy to [insert 
technology] to do what I want it to 
do. 
Using [insert technology] would 
enhance my effectiveness on the job. Item #4 
Learning to operate [insert 
technology] would be easy for me. 
Using [insert technology] would 
make it easier to do my job. Item #5 
It would be easy for me to become 
skilled at using [insert technology]. 
I would find [insert technology] 
useful in my job. Item #6 
I would find [insert technology] 
easy to use. 
 
IT Security Adoption – A Case of Missing Measures 
A plethora of sources consistently suggest that the greatest threat to IT security is not the external threat beyond the perimeter 
(hackers, malware, etc.), but rather the careless or malicious actions of the individuals behind the computers (Kesar 2006; 
Anderson et al. 1999). Secure behaviors include making regular backups, changing passwords, scanning for viruses, and 
many other activities identified by Whitman (2003). Other security activities include updating applications, installing 
patches, configuring firewalls, and turning off unnecessary ports (Whitman 2003; Rosenthal 2002; Stanton et al. 2003).  
Within an organizational setting, each employee represents an endpoint of the organization’s network, and without security-
compliant behavior on the part of each and every employee (and other internal constituents), there can be no organizational 
security. Employees often lack awareness of safe computing policies and procedures (Adams and Sasse, 1999; Furnell, et al. 
2002; Siponen, 2001) and are, therefore, not equipped to be in compliance. Most employees also lack the technical expertise 
to recognize sources of security threats (downloading files, web surfing behavior, etc.).  Even if equipped with the 
appropriate awareness and skill set to effectively protect their assets, the employee must have a desire to do so.  It is therefore 
the task of IT managers to understand the endpoint security problem in the organization, and to address the sources of threat 
in an appropriate manner. 
In terms of technology adoption, characteristics of most security technologies differentiate them from the technologies most 
often examined in adoption studies.  Previous studies involving adoption behavior examined outcomes and determinants 
associated with the use of productivity-based technology such as email utilities or spreadsheet applications.  For example, 
Venkatesh et al. (2003) investigated user expectations of performance gains obtained from the use of a database application 
that could reference product industry standards.  Applications such as these provide clear advantages to their users when 
compared to traditional approaches.  However, not all technologies provide such obvious benefits (Warkentin et al. 2004).  
Information security tools such as anti-spyware programs or biometric access controls may provide a means of controlling 
computing environments or maintaining a healthy technological baseline from which to employ productivity enhancing 
technologies.  Therefore, performance benefits may not be explicitly recognized.   
Security technologies and procedures are intended to thwart unauthorized use of systems, data, and processes.  Their goals 
are to ensure an acceptable level of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.  In nearly all cases, the implementation of these 
technologies and procedures increases the number of controls to the protected assets; thereby elevating the time and effort 
needed to gain authorized access.  By closely examining the language of the items for both PEOU and PU, it is not difficult 
to see where certain items for PU (items 1 and 5) and PEOU (items 3, 5, and 6) may not adequately capture what they are 
intended to capture.  Security technologies and procedures are not intended to be easy to use and quick to complete.  In fact, 
they are intended to have an opposite effect – to impede access, thereby making unauthorized access attempts a more difficult 
undertaking.  To achieve these goals, a research project is proposed. 
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Methods and Results 
To assess the applicability or utility of current adoption determinants within the IT security context a multi-phased research 
approach was undertaken.  The first step in determining the degree to which current adoption measures can be applied to the 
IT security context is to validate the scales; and the first step in validating the scales is to determine their reflective or 
formative nature. 
Reflective vs. Formative Constructs 
As an initial step in validating PEOU and PU, it was necessary to formally assess the reflective or formative nature of the 
constructs in a manner such as that outlined by Petter et al. (2007). Petter et al. describe a series of criteria designed to assess 
a construct’s measures and to classify it as formative or reflective (see Table 3).  A reflective construct is comprised of 
reflective indicators that account for observed variances.  These measures are unidimensional, such that if an individual 
measure is removed from the construct for validity purposes, the content validity of the construct is unaffected.  In contrast, a 
formative construct is “formed” by its measures such that each indicator focuses on a distinct dimension of the construct, 
contributing to the overall content validity of the variable.  When formative constructs are mis-specified as reflective, 
parameter estimates for models involving the mis-specified constructs are likely to be biased and any statistical conclusion 
derived from analysis is subject to scrutiny (Jarvis et al. 2003; Petter et al. 2007). 
Table 3. Decision Rules to Identify Constructs as Formative or Reflective  
(Adopted from Petter et al. 2007; adapted from Jarvis et al. 2003) 
Decision  
Rule 
Formative  
Model 
Reflective 
 Model 
What is the direction of causality 
between the construct and the 
measures? 
Measures define the construct; 
therefore, direction of causality is 
from measures to the construct 
Measures are expressions of the 
construct; therefore, direction of 
causality is from construct to 
measures 
Are the measures 
interchangeable? 
Measures do not need to be 
interchangeable 
The measures need not share a 
common theme 
Dropping a measure may affect 
the content validity of the 
construct 
Measures should be 
interchangeable 
Measures should have a common 
theme 
Dropping a measure should not 
affect the content validity of the 
construct 
Do the measures covary with one 
another? 
Not necessary for measures to 
covary  
A change in one measure does 
not suggest that other measures 
will change as well 
Measures are expected to covary 
A change in one measure 
suggests that other measures will 
change as well 
Do all of the measures have the 
same antecedents and 
consequences? 
Measures may or may not have 
the same antecedents and 
consequences 
Measures must have the same 
antecedents and consequences 
An examination of the PEOU and PU indicators (Table 2) reveals a direction of causality from the indicators to the construct.  
This is an indication of the presence of a formative construct.  For example, the PU items address improvement in task 
accomplishment speed (item #1), job performance (item #2), productivity (item #3), effectiveness (#4), job ease (#5), and 
usefulness of technology (#6).  Each of these indicators, if enabled, would “cause” a perception of usefulness.  So, the 
measures define the construct.  The same argument can be made for the direction of causality of the PEOU items and the 
construct.  In terms of interaction, the PEOU items address clarity (item #1), flexibility (item #2), purpose (item #3), ease of 
learning (item #4), ease of becoming skilled (item #5), and ease of use (item #6).  All of these indicators, if enabled, help to 
form a perception of ease of use.   
In terms of measure interchangeability, formative indicators are not necessarily interchangeable, do not share a common 
theme, and the omission of one indicator has negative consequences for the “completeness” of the construct.  It is not 
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difficult to argue that the indicators for both PU and PEOU meet these criteria, as each one addresses a unique aspect or 
dimension of its respective variable.  In terms of covariance, it is also not difficult to see that as one indicator is adjusted, its 
influence on the language of the others is not negligible.  This condition is directly tied to the independence of the indicators 
from each other in terms of their influence on the overall construct.  Since each indicator of PEOU and PU addresses a 
unique dimension of their respective scale, its influence on other indicators is minimal.  Yet, their presence is critical if all 
aspects of the construct are to be addressed.  Finally, in terms of measurement antecedents and consequences, because each 
measure concerns a unique dimension in forming the constructs, they do not necessarily share a common set of predictors 
(antecedents) or outcomes (consequences).  As each item of the PEOU and PU constructs is independent in terms of its 
contribution to the formation of the constructs, the theoretical origins of the items are distinct, as are their associated 
consequences. 
As a useful comparison, consider the measures developed by Pavlou and Gefen (2005) to measure psychological contract 
violation with a community of sellers: “in general, sellers in Amazon’s/eBay’s auctions have failed to meet their contractual 
obligations to me during our transactions,” “in general, sellers in Amazon’s/eBay’s auctions have done a good job of meeting 
their contractual obligations to me during our transactions,” and “in general, sellers in Amazon’s/eBay’s auctions have 
fulfilled the most important contractual obligations to me during our transactions.” By applying the same decision rules to 
this set of measures, it is concluded that Psychological Contract Violation with a Community of Sellers is a reflective 
construct. 
An initial review indicates that the three associated measures are all expressions of the construct; they do not represent 
different dimensions of the construct. In addition, any one of the three measures could be removed without altering the 
construct’s meaning. Therefore the direction of causality is from the construct to the measures.  Further inspection reveals 
that the measures are expected to covary.  Changes in one measure would almost certainly mean that other measures will 
change as well. The final requirement for a reflective construct is commonality of antecedents and consequences. This 
requirement is also met with Psychological Contract Violation with a Community of Sellers; a careful review of the 
conceptualization of the construct reveals that the antecedents and consequences are the same for all measures.   
Discussion and Conclusions 
As an initial step in assessing the applicability of current adoption measures within the IT security adoption context, the 
constructs, Perceived Ease of Use (PEOU) and Perceived Usefulness (PU) were first selected as representative constructs, 
and then assessed as to their reflective or formative nature.  While previous studies in the IS literature treat these constructs as 
reflective, the findings presented in this study reveal them to be formative.  This is an important first step if future research is 
to assess their validity in the IT security adoption context. 
Implications 
Security technologies continue to increase in prominence as the artifact of interest in technology adoption studies.  As such, 
the availability of applicable measures of adoption predictors becomes increasingly critical.  This study provides an initial 
assessment of the applicability of two of the most commonly utilized predictive measures of adoption behavior -- perceived 
ease of use and perceived usefulness.  While these variables are certainly applicable within the traditional technology 
adoption domain, in their original form, their utility within the security domain is questionable.  The challenge lays in the fact 
that security technologies are not intended to be productive in nature.  Their purpose is to secure environments in which 
productivity-oriented technologies operate. 
As part of this initial assessment of the applicability of perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness within the security 
context, the constructs were identified as formative, thereby challenging their treatment as reflective measures in previous 
adoption literature.  As formative, the constructs require approach to validity and reliability testing distinctive from that 
afforded to reflective constructs.  For technology adoption studies in general, the implications are that reliance upon 
assessments of the scales from previous studies is ill-advised - all constructs must be accurately identified as reflective or 
formative and appropriately assessed.  For security technology adoption studies in particular, the implications are that while 
some constructs are applicable within the broad technology landscape, scenarios involving computer security and/or 
information assurance are unique and require verbiage that captures the rationale for adopting technologies in excess of those 
needed to be productive.  
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Outline for Future Research 
The findings presented in this manuscript constitute results from an initial phase of a multi-phase research endeavor.  The 
next phase of this project involves validity tests of the PEOU and PU scales using methods appropriate to formative 
measures.  It is expected that the results of these validity tests will lend further evidence that PEOU and PU, in their original 
form, are not applicable to the security context and that new measures for these scales must be developed.  Pending this 
outcome, new, security domain specific scales of PEOU and PU are to be developed based on a thorough review of the 
literature and input from an expert panel of security practitioners and academicians.  These newly modified scales will then 
be validated in the manner appropriate of formative measures.  The complete research project is expected to yield validated 
measures of PEOU and PU applicable to the IT security adoption context. 
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